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March lS, 19S3 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. S2-1253 
~~ SOLEM (warden) , et al. 
v. 
BARTLETT (Indian convict) 
Cert to CAS (en bane) (Lay, 
Heaney, Bright, Ross, J. Gib-
son; McMillian, Arnold, diss.) 
Federal/Civil (Habeas) Timely 
SUMMARY: The State of South Dakota contends that the CAS 
erred in holding that the state lacked criminal jurisdiction over 
a cr~comm!!ted by an I~n within a,portion of the Cheyenne 
River Reservation that was opened to settlement by non-Indians in 
190S. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Resp, an enrolled member of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux a plea of guilty in state 
court to a charge of attempte , rape. The crime occurred within 
~-~~~. ~-~. r~~~~~ 
--C\ ~ 0.~. ~ ~ ~ K®~. d~~~. f\UO~ 
f:n--4t. ~ -\, ~ ~ eM ~ 'f~ ~ ~ 
the original confines of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, 
on unallotted land in a portion of the reservation that was 
opened to settlement by non-Indians by the federal Act of May 29, 
190S. Resp sought post-conviction relief in the state trial 
court. It is not clear whether resp sought a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal to the S.D. s.ct., but the State has 
conceded that resp exhausted state remedies. 
Thereafter, resp filed a petn for habeas relief in federal 
court (D. S.D., Porter), claiming that crimes committed in "Indi-
an country," as defined in lS u.s.c. §1151, result in exclusive 
tribal or federal jurisdiction, and that the state therefore 
lacked criminal jurisdiction. The state contended that the 190S 
Act "diminished" the Reservation, thereby divesting the tribe and 
federal government of jurisdiction over unallotted lands within 
the Reservation. 
The DC acknowledged that the issue has resulted in conflict-
ing decisions from the federal and the state courts. The CAS has 
consistently held that the area in question is "Indian country," 
see u.s. ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 47S F.2d 6S4 (CAS 1973): 
U.S. v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (CAS 1979), vacated and remanded for 
consideration of mootness, 446 u.s. 9SO (19SO) (subsequently dis-
missed as moot). The South Dakota s.ct., on the other hand, has 
consistently held that the Reservation was diminished by the 190S 
Act, and is not "Indian country," Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 
117 (S.D. 1977): South Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 
March 10, 19S2). Although the CAS decision in Dupris was vacated 
by this Court, this Court declined to rule on the merits of the 
I 
( 
underlying issue. The DC therefore regarded itself as bound by 
the CAS approach, and granted the writ of habeas corpus. 
The CAS affirmed, en bane, "for the reasons set forth in 
United States v. Dupris, supra: United States v. Long Elk, 565 
F.2d 1032 {CAS 1977): and United States ex rel. Condon v. 
Erickson, [supra]." Two dissenters continued to believe that 
this Court's decision in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 u.s. 
5S4 {1977), required the conclusion that the area in question was 
not "Indian country." 
CONTENTIONS: PETR--The decisions of the South Dakota S.Ct. 
and the CAS are in direct conflict on this issue, necessitating 
review. The conflict is of great importance to the general pub-
lic and law enforcement personnel, since certainty is needed over 
whether a given area lies within the jurisdiction of the state 
courts or the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Although this 
Court has denied petitions in several other diminishment cases, 
none involved a direct conflict between the federal and state 
courts. Furthermore, the CAS decision below conflicted with this 
Court's decisions in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra, and DeCoteau v. 
District County Court, 420 U S. 425 {1975). The CAS placed con-
siderable reliance on its decision in Erickson, supra, but that 
decision preceded this Court's decisions in Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
and DeCoteau. The South Dakota S.Ct., in contrast, properly ana-
lyzed and applied those cases. 
AMICUS DEWEY, ZIEBACH, AND CORSON COUNTIES, SOUTH DAKOTA, ET 
AL.--An amicus brief submitted on behalf of nine counties from 
five states in the area supports petr. Each of the counties con-
tains lands similar to those at issue here. The counties argue 
that, despite the principles announced by this Court in Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe and DeCoteau, no consistent application of those 
principles has emerged. The CAS misapplied those decisions, and 
the judgment below should be reversed. 
RESP--Resp acknowledges the existence of a conflict, but 
argues that resolution of the conflict is not so important as to 
warrant review. Almost all jurisdictional disputes have arisen 
from criminal felony prosecutions. Because of federal supremacy 
and the availability of habeas corpus under 2S u.s.c. §2254, the 
CAS's construction of the 190S Act provides a practical governing 
rule. In recent years, the u.s. Attorney has followed the CAS 
rule and asserted federal jurisdiction over major crimes by Indi-
ans in the area. In fact, therefore, the CAS standard provides 
sufficient certainty over jurisdiction in the area. 
Moreover, the CAS decision is consistent with Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe, supra, and other decisions of this Court. Although Rose-
bud held that a grant of other lands to the State of South Dakota 
for the use of common schools evinced an intent to disestablish 
those area, there are three significant differences between the 
two cases. In Rosebud, this Court noted that neither Congress 
nor the Department of Indian Affairs had sought to exercise its 
authority over the area in question, and that the area was over 
90% non-Indian. In contrast, the Reeservation in this case has 
an Indian majority and contains the Indian capital and the BIA 
headquarters for the reservation. Second, the Rosebud Indians 
~ had agreed to cede to the United States all their claim, right, 
r 
l 
title and interest in part of the reservation. No such agreement 
exists here. Finally, in Rosebud this Court emphasized a Presi-
dential Proclamation opening the reservation to settlement and 
stating that the Indian tribe had ceded "forever and absolutely, 
without any reservation whatsoever, ••• all their claim, title, 
and interest of every kind and character." In contrast, the 
proclamation in the present case merely opened to settlement "all 
the nonmineral, unallotted, unreserved lands within the ••. Res-
ervation." The CAB properly recognized that these and other dif-
ferences require a different result here than in Rosebud. 
DISCUSSION: This case merely involves the application of 
standards set forth in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra. Unfortunate-
ly, the South Dakota s.ct. and the CAB have reached opposite re-
sults in applying those standards to this Reservation, and nei-
ther court seems inclined to give in. There does not appear to 
be any clearly correct answer; the legal question essentially 
turns on which way one chooses to interpret a massive amount of 
ambiguous historical evidence relevant to congressional intent. 
As a practical matter, the CAB standards are likely to dominate 
(if only because the CAB will grant writs of habeas corpus from 
any state criminal convictions), but certainty is needed on 
whether state or federal jurisdiction applies in this area. I 
therefore see no way around a grant in this case, although it may 
be worthwhile to call for the views of the Solicitor General to 
see whether he suggests any good way of avoiding plenary review. 
There are a response and an amicus brief. 
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(Argument Date December 7, 1983) 
Cammie R. Robinson Solem v. Bartlett December 5, 1983 
Question Presented 
Whether the Act of May 29, 1908 fl908 Act] terminated 
the reservation status of those portions of the Cheyenne River 
Indian Reservation opened to purchase and settlement by non-
indians, thereby giving South Dakota criminal jurisdiction over 
offenses involving Indians occuring on those opened portions. 
bench memo: Solem v. Bartlett page L. 
I. BACKGROUND ~ ~-~ 
There are three types of land relevan here: ~ tribe ~
owned land within the Cheyenne River Indian Res 
[Reservation]; (2) non-indian owned land within 
and, (3) land beyond the boundaries of the 
first two types of land constitute "Indian Country" within tH 
meaning of 18 u.s.c. §1151. 1 Generally, only federal and 
~ 
courts have criminal jurisdiction over offenses involving Indian 
affairs in "Indian Country."2 The State has conceded that if the 
act at issue here occurred in "Indian Country" it does not have 
-------
jurisidiction. The act indisputedly occurred 
.....---------. 
land that was within the original boundaries of the -
but that was opened to settlement by the 1908 Act. The State 2)~ 
claims that the 1908 Act terminated the reservation status of al~ 
land opened by that Act that was subsequently sold to non-
indians. Respondents argue that the 1908 Act merely opened the ~~ 
land to settlement without diminishing the Reservation 
boundaries. The history necessary to resolve this dispute is set 
out most clearly in the SG's Brief at 7-21. I will merely 
summarize the major points. 
At the time of the 1908 Act, Congress was taking steps 
1The text of §1151 is set out in Appendix c of the Cert. 
Petition at A-13. It is important only for the fact that it 
defines both indian owned and non-indian owned land within a 
reservation as "Indian Country." 
2The exceptions to this rule are not relevant here. 
toward the eventual abolishment of the reservation system and the 
assimilation of the Indian. This goal was being approached in 
two different ways. First, the "cession" approach effected a 
present and total surrender of all tribal interest in the ceded 
land in return for an unconditional commitment by the United 
States to an agreed payment. Under this approach, the 
reservation status of the ceded lands terminated as soon as the 
agreement was perfected. Second, the "land sale" approach opened 
up unallotted reservation lands to sale to and settlement by non-
indians under the provisions of the homestead and township laws. 
Under this approach, the Government acted as a sales agent, 
promising to credit the proceeds of the land in trust to the 
benefit of the tribe. Although it was anticipated that the 
unallotted lands would be sold, the Indian assimilated, and the 
reservation status of all lands terminated, Acts that merely 
opened land up to settlement did not express the same intent 
immediately to terminate the reservation status to the opened 
land as did the cession agreements. 
In the 1930's Congress changed its Indian policy and, in 
~ 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, renewed its commitment to 
preservation of the reservation system. It did so partly by 
~------------~-------------------~ returning to tribal ownership all the unsold lands that had been 
opened up in the early 1900's. This policy has persisted, and to 
give it effect, this Court has developed certain legal standards 
to resolve the question whether any given act of Congress 
immediately diminished reservation boundaries or merely opened 
land to non-indian settlement without immediately terminating the 
5~-u..o--r 
reservation status of such land. 3 See Rosebud Sio~-~ 
Kniep, 430 u.s. 584 (1977}; DeCoteau v. District County Court, 
4 2 0 U • S • 4 2 5 ( 19 7 5} ; Matt z v • Arnett , 412 U. S . 4 81 (19 7 3} ; 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 u.s. 351 (1962). These legal 
standards are not disputed here. The ~2! ques~is~ther ~ ~ 
CA8 appli~d t~e~ corre?~Y when it held that the 1908 Act did not 
-
diminish the reservation boundaries established in 1889. I read 
the applicable legal standards as follows: 
(1} Congressional intent controls. See Rosebud, 
430 u.s. at 586; DeCoteau, 420 u.s. at 444. 
(2) In determining intent, this Court will read 
doubtful or ambiguous expressions in favor of the 
Indian and against termination of reservation status. 
See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586; Mattz, 412 u.s. at 505 
("A congressional determination to terminate [an Indian 
reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act 
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances."). 
(3) "The mere fact that a reservation has been 
opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the 
opened area has lost its reservation status." Rosebud, 
430 u.s. at 505. See also DeCoteau, 420 u.s. at 447 
(An Act "could be considered a termination provision 
only if continued reservation status were inconsistent 





Remaining true to these legal standards often requires  
different results depending on the particular Act involved. 
Compare Rosebud, 430 u.s. 584 (Acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910 
showed clear intent of Congress to diminish boundaries of Rosebud 
3sale of unallotted reservation land to non-indians does not 
automatically terminate its reservation status. Only an act of 
Congress can do that. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 
278, 285 ( 1909) (" [W) hen Congress has once established a 
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the 
reservation until separated therefrom by Congress."). 
Reservation and to terminate reservation status of opened land) ~ 
DeCoteau, 420 u.s. 425 (agreement with the Sisseton and Wahpeton 
Indians showed clear intent to terminate reservation status of 
all unallotted lands of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation), 
with Mattz, 412 u.s. 481 (Act opening unallotted reservation 
lands to settlement did not show clear intent to terminate 
reservation status of such lands)~ Seymour, 368 u.s. 351 (same). 
The Court granted cert. in this case to resolve the --~/C~f~ between CA8 and the South Dakota Supreme Court over 
~ interpretation of the 1908 Act. Since its decision in United 
the 
 ' 
~ft~ States v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (CA8 1973), CA8 consistently has 
~ held that the 1908 Act did not diminish the original boundaries 
~of the Cheyenne River Reservation. See United States v. Dupris, 
612 F.2d 319 (CA8), vacated as moot, 446 u.s. 980 (1979) ~ United 
States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032 (CAS 1977) • 4 State courts, on 
the other hand, consistently have held that the 1908 Act 
terminated the reservation status of all opened lands sold to ' ~ 
I~ bf1 ... j. 
non-indians. See South Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W. 2d 133 ~~o~, ~ 
Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W. 2d 117 (S.D. 1977). 
II. DISCUSSION 
The State argues that the 1908 Act at issue here is more 
4Although Erickson was decided before this Court's decisions in 
Rosebud and DeCoteau, CA8 re-examined the issue in Dupris and 
found its prior decision fully consistent with the intervening 
Supreme Court decisions. 
.,>, 
similar to the Acts construed in Rosebud and DeCoteau than to 
those construed in Mattz and Seymour and that Congress clearly 
intended immediately to terminate the reservation status of the 
lands thereby opened to settlement. I disagree. 
Applying the relevant legal standards to the acts 
opening the Rosebud Reservation to settlement, this Court found 
on the face of the 1904 Act a clear congressional intent 
immediately to diminish reservation boundaries. 5 The crucial 
language of that Act provided in relevant part: 
The said Indians belonging on the Rosebud 
Reservation, South Dakota, for the consideration 
hereinafter named, do hereby cede, surrender, grant, 
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, 
title, and interest in and to all that part of the 
Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted, 
situtated within the boundaries of Gregory County. 
Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 597 (emphasis added). 
The Court held that this language was "'precisely 
suited' to disestablishment," Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 589 n.5, 592, 
and that it made clear that Congress had enacted all three Acts 
5The opening of the Rosebud Reservation was accomplished by 
three acts. In 1901, Inspector James McLaughlin was sent to 
negotiate a cession agreement with the Indians occupying the 
Rosebud Reservation. He explained to them that the agreement 
would "leave your reservation "a compact, and almost square 
tract, and would leave your reservation about the size and area 
of the Pine Ridge Reservation." Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 592. Three 
fourths of the male Indian adults signed this agreement. 
Congress failed to ratify it because it provided for an outright 
payment of $1,040,000 to the Indians. In 1904 an agreement was 
signed by a majority of the male Indian adults that was identical 
to the 1901 agreement except for the terms of payment. 
Additional lands were opened to settlement by the acts of 1907 
and 1910 and this Court found that the cession intent remained 
the same in those acts as it had in 1901 and 1904. See Rosebud, 
430 u.s. at 606, 609. 
with the "unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment," id. 
at 592. Thus, the Court held that the Acts were intended to 
diminish reservation boundaries "pro tanto" rather than at some 
point in the future. See Rosebud, 430 u.s. at 588. The 
legislative history supports this conclusion. See H.R. Rep. No. 
443, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1904) quoted in Rosebud, 430 u.s. 
6 at 595 n.l7. 
The language of the 1908 Act is distinguishable and 
suggests that the Act was merely a "E d s0 agreement similar 
to that described in Mattz. The terms of the 1908 Act proclaim 
only that the unallotted portions of the reservation will be 
opened to entry and settlement by, and sale to, non-indians. The 
operative language provides in relevant part: 
That the Secretary of the Interior •.. is 
authorized a~directed ••• to sell and di~ose of all 
that portion of the Cheyenne River ••. reservation[] 
••• lying [between certain designated boundaries] .••• 
Section 1 of 1908 Act at A-3. 
The other terms of the Act merely describe how the land is to be 
surveyed, divided, and sold (Sec. 2); how the price is to be 
determined (Sec. 3); the manner in which payment is to be made 
6The decision in DeCoteau that reservation boundaries had been 
diminished was based on identical language, see 420 U.S. at 445, 
and similar legislative history, id. at 433-35. The language and 
legislative history made clear th~Congress and the Indians were 
fully aware of and intended immediately to terminate the 
reservation status of the unallotted lands opened to settlement. 
The Court, however, was careful to emphasize that its decision 
was fully consistent with the legal principles discussed above. 
See 420 u.s. at 447 ("We adhere without qualification to both the 
holdings and the reasoning of those decisions [in Mattz and 
Seymour]. But the gross differences between the facts of those 
cases and the facts here cannot be ignored."). 
,. ,. 
(Sec. 4); and the manner in which such payment is to be credited 
to the Indians (Sees. 5 & 6). The Act seems merely to establish 
a land sale with the Government acting as real estate agent. 
Although it would be fair to assume that Congress intended that 
the reservation eventually would be abolished and the Indians 
fully assimilated, I agree with Respondent and the SG that on its 
face the 1908 Act does not express the clear intent immediately 
to diminish reservation boundaries that this Court has required 
in all of its prior cases. 
l'fl>l{ 
In both the Rosebud Acts and the 1908 Act, the language 
of the first section, discussed above, announces the general 
purpose of the legislation and provides the clearest indication 
whether Congress intended the particular Act to diminish 
reservation boundaries or merely to sell land. Without the 
}\ . "" unequivocal cess1on language that was so crucial in Rosebud, the 
similarities between the Acts at issue in that case and the Act 
at issue here are insignificant. Although some of the similar 
provisions are mentioned in Rosebud as supporting the intent to 
diminish boundaries, they support that intent only when read in 
context. The ~ebud Court made clear that the determinative / tt(tJ '! 
factor was the unequivocal cession language in the first sect~
and that all subsequent provisions must be read in light of t~~ 
purpose announced therein. See 430 u.s. at 608-09. Because the 
State has not established that the first section of the 1908 Act 
clearly evidenced an intent to diminish reservation boundaries, 
its reliance on the similarities between the Rosebud Acts and the 
1908 Act is misplaced. Respondent has explained convincingly how 
~~&v...tt:ft9T:f~Oo ,,J 
~k~~b--~~ 
each one of the similar provisio nsistent with ~e 
preservation of original reservation boundaries. See Resp Brief 
at 22 (Liquor provision) ; at 27 (School lands provision) . 
Interpreting congressional intent is particularly tricky 
in this area. All of the Acts that opened reservation land 
settlement at this time were enacted with an eye toward the 
eventual abolishment of the reservation system. The 
distinction between the various Acts is whether they intended to 
terminate the reservation status of the opened lands immediately 
or merely to lay the groundwork for future termination. This is 
a distinction that Congress probably was not clearly aware of at 
the time. It is important today because of the renewed 
commitment to preservation of the reservation system and of the 
Indian's cultural identity. Besides looking at the statutory 
language, the distinction is best resolved by looking at the 
historical context of the Act - both at the time of its enactment 
and subsequently. 
The original boundaries of the Reservation established 
in 1889 encompassed 2.8 million acres. The 1908 Act opened 1.6 
million acres of this land to settlement. At that time, 400,000 
----------------------------------acres in the opened area had been allotted as Indian lands and an 
additional 133,000 acres were allotted before the 1909 
Proclamation. This left some 1 million acres open to 
homesteaders. See SG's Brief at 26-27 n.31. Although the SG is 
unable to give the actual acreage, he informs the Court that 
"most of the remaining unallotted land was unsold." Today, -
"almost half the opened area remains in Indian ownership, all ----------- ---------
it, with minor exceptions, in trust or restricted status." Id. 
Despite the attempts of 1908, the Indian remained the prominent 
resident of the Cheyenne River Reservation. In light of these 
statistics, this Court should be slow to infer an intent to 
diminish reservation boundaries from less than compelling 
evidence. 
Since the 1908 Act, both the Secretary and the Tribe 
have acted as if the original reservation boundaries have 
remained in tact. After passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, the Secretary approved the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's 
Constitution, which provided in relevant part: 
The jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Reservation 
Sioux Tribe of Indians shall extend to the territory 
within the original confines of the diminished 
reservation boundaries, which are described by the Act 
of March 2, 1889. Resp's Brief at 37. 
At the same time the tribe reorganized its court system, and the 
Secretary approved its Code of Offenses, which provided in 
relevant part: 
The [Tribe] ••• shall have jurisdiction over all 
offenses when committed by any member of the [Tribe] on 
the reservation and any person consenting to the 
jurisdiction as hereinafter provided •••• 
The Cheyenne River Reservation shall be taken to 
include all territory within the original reservation 
boundaries •••• Resp's Brief at 47. 
The 1930's did not represent any change in the jurisdiction of 
the Tribe or the perceptions of the Secretary: the tribal court 
and tribal police had exercised jurisdiction over the original 
reservation with the Secretary's approval since at least 1911. 
See Resp's Brief at 46. In light of this consistent history of 
tribal jurisdiction, there has been no reported case in which an 
Indian was prosecuted by the state prior to 1963. 7 There was 
good reason for the Indian to be wary of State criminal 
jurisdiction in 1908. At that time, Indians were very much 
discriminated against and could not serve on the juries that 
would try them of any state criminal charge. In light of the 
strong Indian interest in avoiding State criminal jurisidiction 
in 1908 and the continued assertion of jurisdiction by the tribal 
court since that time, this Court should not be quick to infer 
that the 1908 Act terminated the reservation status 
lands. 
Finally, Eagle Butte is a town within the 
the 1908 Act. It is also the capital of the Tribe 




and the he~~~ 
of the office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Bureau was 
moved there in 1950 on the ground that it made more sense to have 
the office "at some point near the center of the reservation." 
See Resp's Brief at 35-36. Absent an unequivocal intent to the 
7The Stqt~'s rel~nce on United States v. LaPlant, 200 F. 92 
(D.S.D. ~ll), is ~isleading. In that case a non-indian was 
indicted for homicide of a non-indian victim on alienated lands 
within the orginal boundaries of the Reservation. The DC 
dismissed the indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction on the 
ground that the State acquired jurisdiction whenever the Indian 
title to the land was extinguished. That case involved non-
indians, but in any event it applied the wrong legal standard to 
determine the existence of federal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
does not depend on title but on whether the land is within the 
reservation. See United States v. Thomas, 151 u.s. 577 (1894) 
(sustaining federal jurisdiction over homicide by Indian 
occurring on land within a reservation to which Indian title had 
been extinguished). The "title approach" to jurisdiction taken 
by the LePlant court has been repudiated by the present 
definition of "Indian Country," which includes all land within an 
Indian reservation whether or not held under Indian title. 
bench memo: Solem v. Bartlett page 12 
contrary, I agree with the SG that it does not make much sense -"to treat as no longer part of t he Reservation an area which 
includes the tribal capital, the Indian Agency and the major 
Indian town, within which some two-thirds of [the] tribal members 
reside (outnumbering non-Indians there), and where almost half 
the acreage is Indian owned." SG's Brief at 27. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The legal principles are clear: this Court will not 
infer a congressional intent to terminate the reservation status 
of opened lands absent clear evidence in the language of the Act 
and the relevant legislative history. CA8 applied the relevant 
principles to the 1908 Act and found that Congress had not 
intended to diminish reservation boundaries when it opened the 
surplus land of the Cheyenne River Reservation to sale and 
settlement. After reviewing the language of the Act, and 
comparing it with the language of the Acts that opened the 
Rosebud and Lake Traverse Reservations, and after reviewing the 
relevant history cited in the briefs, I believe that the CAS's 
determination was correct and that this Court should affirm. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: Herman S. Solem, Warden, and Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General 
of South Dakota v. John Bartlett, No. 82-1253 
(Case was argued December 7, 1983) 
DATE: December 8, 1983 
Since this case is to be discussed at your Conference tomorrow, 
before the Attorney General of South Dakota can submit a motion 
for leave to file a supplemental brief, he has requested that I 
circulate the attached letter (not referred to at oral argument) 
calling attention to a significant typographical error in his 
brief at page A-28. 
The same error is repeated in the brief of the respondent 
at page 21. 
Respectfully, 
Alexander L. Stevas 
J. ·R:EC:EIVED 
DEC-71983 
TOBIN LAW 0 F' F' ICES, P. C. 
SUITE 1113 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT. U.S. 
1875 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N . W . 
TOM D. TOBIN* 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009 
(202) 467-5712 
* SOUTH DAKOTA OFFICES 
422 MAIN STREET DAVID ALBERT MUSTONE 
.JOSEPH E . ELLINGSON* 
WILLIAM W . SHAKELY 
ALVIN R. PAH LK E* 
WINNER, SOUTH DAKOTA 57580 
The Honorable Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the 
United States 
1 First Street, Northeast 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
December 7, 1983 
Re: Herman Solem, et al. v. John Bartlett, 
No. 82-1253 
Dear Hr. Stevas: 
The purpose of this letter is to bring to the 
Court's attention a serious typographical error appearing in 
the Appendix to the Brief of the Petitioners filed in the 
above-captioned case. This error appears in the reproduction 
of an important portion of the legislative history of the 
statute in question, and has been repeated in the Brief of the 
Respondent. 
The error is as follows: At page A-28 of the 
Appendix, lines 16 and 17, the phrase "reservations is 
diminished" should read "reservations as diminished". See 
H.R. Rep. 1539, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3(1908). 
Thank you for your assistance. 
cc: counsel of record 
Sincerely, 
~'))~rob,~ 
Tom D. Tobin 
Counsel for the Amici 
Counties of Dewey, et al. 
82-1253 SOLEM v. BARTLETT Argued 12/7/83 
__ · (1l~J(!!G tt7 ~..&.) 
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Justice Stevens ~~ 
Justice O'Connor 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 6, 1984 
Re: 82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
February a' I 1984 
82-1253 Solem v. Bartl~tt 
Thurgood: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~ttprtutt <qond o-f tqt ~nitt~ $ihdcil 
~a:s~hm. 11). <.q. 2.ll,?J!.,;l · 
Re: No. 82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
I. • 
Februa 8' 1984 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REf:iNQUIST 
.iu.prttnt <ijqlttf qf t!rt ~~b .Staftg 
jlufringtcn. Jl. <q. 2Cgt'!~ 
February 8, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1253 Solem v. Bartlett 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
~ttvrttttt Qj:ltltrt ltf tqt 1tni.ttb ~taft% 
11ht,gftington, ~. <!):. 2lJ.;tJl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
February 8, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1253 Solem v. Bartlett 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMB1!: .. 8 0,. 
THE CHIEI'" JUSTICE 
.u.prmtt <qourt #£ tqt ~~ .itatt• 
Jru!ringhtn. ~. <!J. 2llp'l>~ 
February 13, 1984 
/ 





Copies to the Conference 
··('>--....... :(._,>---- .('~~ . .. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~nvumt afottrl of tfrt~ ~taft-tr 
~lfin.ghm. ~. at. 2ll~Jt~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
February 13, 1984 
Re: 82-1253 - Solem v. Bartlett 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM15ER8 01'" 
.JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
i'nprmtt <!famt af firt ~~ .ita±t.s 
~lfittghtu. J. <!f. 2llp'1-~ 
February 13, 1984 
No. 82-1253 
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Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
&82-1253 Solem v. Bartlett (David)% 
TM for the Court 
1st draft 2/3/84 
Joined by JPS 2/6/84 
Joined by HAB 2/8/84 
Joined by LFP 2/8/84 
Joined by WHR 2/8/84 
Joined by SDO 2/8/84 
Joined by TM 2/10/84 
Joined by BRW 2/13/84 
Joined by CJ 2/14/84 
